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Early in 1943, prompted by an urgent call from a regional office, the
five members of the Securities and Exchange Commission hastily con-
vened in Washington to confront what had become a minor crisis in the
federal securities laws. Milton Freeman, then Assistant Solicitor of the
S.E.C., who drafted Rule 10b-5 in response to the crisis, recalls the story
best:
I .. .received a call from Jim Treanor who was then the Director
of the Trading and Exchange Division. He said, "I have just been
on the telephone with Paul Rowen," who was then the S.E.C. Re-
gional Administrator in Boston, "and he has told me about the presi-
dent of some company in Boston who is going around buying up
stock in his company from his own shareholders at $4.00 a share,
and he has been telling them that the company is doing very badly,
whereas, in fact, the earnings are going to be quadrupled and will be
$2.00 a share for this coming year. Is there anything we can do
about it?" So he came upstairs and I called in my secretary and I
looked at Section 10(b) and I looked at Section 17, and I put them
together, and the only discussion we had there was where "in con-
nection with the purchase or sale" should be, and we decided it
should be at the end.
We called the Commission and we got on the calendar, and I
don't remember whether we got there that morning or after lunch.
We passed a piece of paper around to all the commissioners. All the
commissioners read the [proposal for Rule 10b-5] and they tossed it
on the table, indicating approval. Nobody said anything except Sum-
ner Pike who said, "Well, . . . we are against fraud, aren't we?"
That is how it happened.1
Also at that meeting was Freeman's assistant, a young S.E.C. lawyer
named Louis Loss. Since then he has been intimately involved in virtually
every major official movement within the field of securities regulation.2
t Assistant Professor of Law, Emory University.
1. Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Law's, 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 922-23 (.1967).
2. Professor Loss was the principal drafter of the Uniform Securities Act, UNIFORM SECURITIES
1173
The Yale Law Journal
His contributions to the study of securities regulation have been immense.
Professor Loss has long been acknowledged as having written "the au-
thoritative treatise in this field."' If for no other reasons than these, his
latest book, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation,4 demands attention.
But Professor Loss' book deserves notice on its own as a valuable con-
tribution to legal scholarship. It is the most important example of a new
genre of law books5 that offer law students and teachers an alternative to
the recently criticized vehicle of traditional legal instruction-the case
method.' The book is designed not only for use as a general classroom
text, but also as a basic reference by the practitioner.7 One might expect
that, just as a servant cannot serve two masters, a book as ambitious as
Securities Regulation is bound to disappoint at least one of its audiences.
Happily, however, the book attends to the needs of both groups.
The book's success is at least partially attributable to an elegant style,
which presents this highly technical and detailed area of the law in a way
that is both crisp and engaging. For a book as comprehensive as Securities
Regulation to be coherent, however, it needs either a unifying theme or at
least some statement of the author's own views on the policy implications
of the legal rules described. Unfortunately, the book does not provide any
such perspective for its readers. This is the book's greatest failing.
I. SECURITIES REGULATION: LAW vs. THEORY
The rapidly changing nature of the subject matter creates inherent diffi-
culties for books such as Securities Regulation. Events can quickly over-
take even a recently published work in this field. For this reason, a more
theoretical approach to the subject is often helpful. Such an approach pro-
vides the reader with a basis for analyzing the rules described, and en-
ables readers themselves to evaluate newly developed rules.
ACT (1981) (current version appears at BLUE SKY L. REP. (C.C.H.) 5512.05-5559), which has
been adopted or substantially adopted by 39 states. He is perhaps best known for his authoritative,
multi-volume treatise, L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION (2d ed. 1961 & Supp. 1969). More re-
cently, Professor Loss was the reporter and principal drafter of the proposed Uniform Federal Securi-
ties Code, see A.L.I. FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE (1980).
3. R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 35 (5th ed.
1982).
4. L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION (1983) [hereinafter cited by page
number only].
5. See, e.g., D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 1980); B. BITTKER & J.
EUSTICE, FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLD-
ERS (1980); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977).
Fundamentals of Securities Regulation is the first securities regulation textbook designed for use as
a primary classroom tool that relegates cases to secondary status.
6. See Bok, A Flawed System, HARV. MAG., May-June 1983, at 38 (reprinting President's Re-
port to the Board of Overseers for 1981-82); Margolick, The Trouble with America's Law Schools,
N.Y. Times, May 22, 1983, § 6 (Magazine), at 20.
7. P. xix.
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For example, on March 3, 1982, the S.E.C. approved temporary Rule
415, which permits registration of securities "for the shelf."' Shelf regis-
tration permits corporations for the first time to make delayed or continu-
ous offerings and sales of securities.9 The temporary rule represents a rad-
ical step in the way large companies sell securities. Although shelf
registration may eliminate some of the waste inherent in forcing large
companies to go through the tedious and costly registration process each
time they wish to issue stock, it raises some important questions about the
registration process.'0
Professor Loss describes Rule 415 in the engaging style that character-
izes the whole book." He raises a number of practical considerations that
might prove of value to a practitioner with little experience in the area.
For example, he advises that "the issuer that wants to offer debt securities
must qualify an indenture that is 'open ended'; . . . and issuers must also
make their peace with the state blue sky administrators."'"
Perhaps it would be futile to attempt a more detailed treatment of such
issues within the confines of a single volume, but one can immediately see
that a practitioner who must actually use Rule 415 will need a good deal
more help than this book provides. Although the detailed footnotes direct
the reader to such assistance-the relevant S.E.C. releases' 3 and periodi-
cal literature14-the discussion of Rule 415 in Securities Regulation will
only permit the practitioner to begin to evaluate the possibility of using
shelf registration.
What is lacking, then, is some sort of theoretical model, not only of
shelf registration under Rule 415, but of the registration process gener-
ally.'" Professor Loss informs the reader of the 1983 expiration date and
8. Sec. Act Release No. 6383, 24 S.E.C. Doc. (CCH) 1262, 1288-94 (Mar. 3, 1982). The text of
the rule is at 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (1983).
9. Sec. Act Release No. 6423, 26 S.E.C. Doc. (CCH) 2, 8 (Sept. 22, 1982).
10. See Ferrara & Sweeney, Shelf Registration Under S.E.C. Temporary Rule 415, 5 CORP. L.




13. Pp. 144-45 nn.53, 55-59.
14. Pp. 142 n.43, 144 n.54.
15. If the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1982), has an underlying theory, it is that full
disclosure in the registration and offering process is the key to achieving the twin goals of reducing
fraud and enabling investors to make an informed choice concerning securities offered for public sale.
See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 3, at 40. The full disclosure philosophy has come under
powerful attack on both fronts.
First of all, critics argue, the '33 Act does little to reduce fraud because the registration statement
has become a stylized document in which certain ritualistic incantations take the place of meaningful
disclosure. As a result, "the common or even the moderately well informed investor is almost as much
at the mercy of the issuer as was his pre-SEC parent." Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp.,
332 F. Supp. 544, 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
Second, commentators such as Professor Homer Kripke contend that compulsory disclosure is un-
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concludes only that "[a]t this writing one can only speculate about the
impact of Rule 415 on capital formation and investment banking prac-
tices."'" A discussion of the general costs and benefits of registration
would better equip the reader, whether student or practitioner, to analyze
Rule 415 and the changes it is sure to undergo this year. The book does
not completely lack such a theoretical perspective, but the treatment is
spotty.
Professor Loss' treatment of the landmark Rule 10b-5 case, Dirks v.
SEC,'7 further illustrates the difficulty of producing a treatise of lasting
value to students and practitioners. The Supreme Court had granted certi-
orari,' 8 but had not yet decided the case when this book was sent to the
publisher. The Court reversed the D.C. Circuit's decision and held that
Raymond Dirks, an investment analyst, did not violate Rule 10b-5 when
he disclosed information about the Equity Funding scandal to his firm's
clients.
Loss cites the Dirks case five times for several propositions,"9 but no-
where does he examine the holding of the case in a thorough, systematic
way.20 The absence of a broad theoretical treatment of the issue raised in
Dirks may leave the reader with the uneasy feeling that the book presents
a purely static, although panoramic, treatment of securities regulation.
Examination of the troublesome policy questions regarding insider trading
would provide some perspective on the yet unforeseen problems that will
surely arise in this area.
necessary. The market, they reason, provides an adequate incentive to disclose any information that
will enhance the stock price. See H. KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLO-
SURE-REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE 117-33 (1979) (anti-fraud provisions of securities
laws would prevent companies from making misleading disclosures even if companies were not re-
quired to disclose facts that would have negative impact on stock prices). Indeed, until recently, the
'33 Act prevented the very form of disclosure that investors should value most highly-management's
forward-looking projections. See S.E.C. Act Release No. 6084, 13 S.E.C. Doc. (CCH) 1048 (July 10,
1979). It is difficult to predict how, if at all, these criticisms will affect the rules regarding disclosure.
Still, Professor Loss should have apprised readers of competing points of view and of the kind of
analysis that goes into the ultimate investment decision.
16. P. 145.
17. 103 S.Ct. 3255 (1983), ret'g, 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
18. P. 816 n.71.
19. The case is cited to illustrate the close relation between S.E.C. fraud concepts and common
law deceit, p. 816 n.71; to illustrate that securities analysts must respect the disclose-or-refrain-from-
trading obligations of their corporate sources, pp. 841 n.62, 843 n.67; to illustrate the Supreme
Court's "invitation" to lower courts-extended in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193
n.12 (1976)-to determine whether mere recklessness, as opposed to actual scienter, is sufficient to
establish civil liability under § 10b and Rule 10b-5, p. 885 n.104; and to illustrate that Rule lOb-5
applies to broker dealers "along with everybody else," p. 946 n.I.
20. An example of a more general, theoretical analysis of the issues in the regulation of insider
trading appears in Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, EVidentiary Privileges, and the Pro-
duction of Inforntalion, 1981 SuP. CT. REV. 309, 337-39 (judicial treatment of insider trading de-
pends on "a multitude of considerations and more than a few guesses about the costs of different
rules").
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The spectrum of opinion in the debate surrounding Dirks ranges from
the view that insider trading is generally desirable21 to the view that it is
wholly undesirable,22 and encompasses various opinions in between.23 Ad-
vocates of considerable stature have advanced arguments for each of these
positions,2 4 further demonstrating the complex theoretical nature of the
problem. There is no sure way to predict how the insider trading rules
will evolve; certainly Dirks is not the last word.25 To have produced a
book that would not quickly become outdated, Professor Loss should have
provided a structure from which to analyze and judge future develop-
ments. Pure description, regardless of its quality, is not enough.
Despite the lack of a theoretical framework, the author's towering com-
mand of the subject matter and laborious attention to the development of
the law since 1969 (when the last supplement of his multi-volume treatise
was published) will be valuable to students and practitioners who need
either a concise treatment of a highly complex field or an excellent histori-
cal view of how the subject has evolved since 1933.
One example of the mastery with which the book conveys information
about the securities laws is Professor Loss' introduction to the complex
statutory pattern of the Securities Act of 1933.2 The problem for any
student or practitioner confronting the material for the first time--as well
as for any teacher or writer t.rying to convey it-is that the statute, stand-
ing without administrative gloss, is inherently unworkable. In Professor
Loss' words, "[I]t required four administrative inventions-monuments to
the vaunted flexibility of the administrative inventions [the Red Herring
Fiction, the letter of comment, the price amendment, and the acceleration
of the effective date of the registration statement] to make the Act work.
'27
21. See H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966) (insider trading results
in no significant injury to long-term investors and is the only practical means of compensating certain
executives).
22. Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities
Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 345-48 (1979) (insider trading rules should bar transactions where one
party has informational advantage that public investors may not lawfully overcome).
23. Dooley, Enforcement of Isider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1, 55 (1980) (know-
ingly trading on insider information may be morally "bad" but costs of enforcement frequently out-
weigh benefits); Easterbrook, supra note 20, at 310 (insider trading addresses question of whether an
individual who creates new knowledge possesses a property right in the knowledge and can use it to
advantage in subsequent transactions).
24. See supra notes 20-23.
25. In Dirks, while holding that a tippee-investment adviser did not violate Rule 10b-5 by disclos-
ing material inside information, the Court nonetheless concluded that "[t]he need for a ban on some
tippee trading is clear." Dirks v. SEC, 103 S.Ct. 3255, 3263 (1983). The tippee-investment adviser
was not liable because the tipper, an insider, did not benefit personally from his disclosure and there-
fore did not violate any fiduciary duty to the company. Id. at 3265-66. Difficult and yet unanswered
questions concern how to determine whether an insider benefits personally from a transaction. See id.
at 3266-67.
26. Pp. 92-96, 125-40; see pp. 97-139.
27. P. 126.
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Taken together, these enable firm counitment underwritings to take
place, although not without considerable confusion2" and controversy.29
Before Professor Loss presents this material, he warns the reader that
the statutory "scheme of involuted drafting does not facilitate comprehen-
sibility."30 Having said this, however, he goes on to explain the statutory
framework of the '33 Act clearly and concisely. The book thus fulfills its
promise of offering the reader a "coherent and smoothflowing treatment of
the basics of the entire field."3"
Unfortunately, those sections of the book that Professor Loss has left to
others do not come across quite as clearly. The most noticeable example is
the treatment of legislation directing the creation of a National Market
System (NMS). Professor Loss delegates the entire coverage of this impor-
tant subject to Professor Norman Poser, a former Executive Vice Presi-
dent of the American Stock Exchange and a former Assistant Director of
the S.E.C.'s Division of Trading and Markets. Loss merely reprints most
of a long article by Poser, 2 which describes in detail the structure of the
existing securities markets and Congress' National Market System propo-
sal. The article also analyzes and explains the S.E.C.'s failure to imple-
ment Congress' directive to develop a national market system. Professor
Poser concludes first that this failure is the result of several factors: the
S.E.C.'s "traditional regulatory orientation, its lawyer-dominated staff,
and the limited authority provided to it by Congress to take the lead effec-
tively in a restructuring of the stock markets;" 3 and also that "the basic
premise of the NMS proposal [that a national market will encourage
price competition among market makers and specialists] is open to serious
question.
'3 4
Professor Loss' only reaction to this controversial conclusion is con-
tained in his brief introduction to the National Market System portion of
the book. He comments obliquely that "one does not tamper lightly with
28. For example, the '33 Act's definition of "offer" is much broader than the standard definition
found in the context of contract law. Section 2(3) defines "offer" to include "every attempt . . . to
dispose of" as well as "every . . .solicitation of an offer to buy, a security."
29. For example, as Professor Loss points out, the Commission uses its power to accelerate the
effective date of a company's registration statement to enforce its view that
indemnification of an officer or director (or a person in control of the issuer) against statutory
liabilities is unenforceable, however valid the indemnification may be as a matter of state law,
because it tends to frustrate the in terroren purpose of individual liability under § 11 for
negligent deficiencies in the registration statement.
Pp. 133-34. The S.E.C's authority to implement this policy is open to serious challenge.
30. P. 92.
31. P. xix.
32. Poser, Restructuring the Stock Markets: A Critical Look at the SEC's National Market Sys-
tem, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881 (1981), reprinted in part pp. 667-76, 749-98.
33. Poser, supra note 32, at 957; pp. 797-98.
34. Pp. 957, 798; see Poser, supra note 32, at 951-57; pp.7 9 7 - 9 8 .
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the guts of the New York Stock Exchange." 35 He goes on to say that the
article is reprinted not because Professor Loss agrees with it, but because
it is "an excellent exposition of a technical, complex and vital subject." 8
Whether or not one agrees with Professor Poser's conclusions, Securities
Regulation should at least summarize some alternative points of view, or
better yet, indicate Professor Loss' own opinions about whether a Na-
tional Market System is attainable or worthwhile. This issue is fraught
with political overtones and special interest group lobbying. An opinion
from an unbiased observer such as Professor Loss would be welcome
indeed.
II. THE CASE AGAINST CASEBOOKS
In April 1983, Derek C. Bok, President of Harvard University and
former Dean of the Harvard Law School, issued what has been character-
ized as a "sweeping indictment" of law schools in the United States.3"
Among his criticisms was the medium of the case method,3 which many
consider to be anachronistic and inefficient.
The epistemology of late nineteenth century positivist legal scholars
viewed law as science, and the legal system as a way to "find" pre-ex-
isting legal principles. Under this view, the case method provided the
"marble" at which students could chisel and hammer until the legal prin-
ciples that lay within finally emerged in recognizable form.
This perspective vanished with the advent of Legal Realism in the
1920's. The case method survives, however, for a variety of reasons. First
of all, it requires little preparation on the part of the law professors who
"write" the books (i.e., assemble the cases), and on the part of those
professors who use the cases as the basis for the so-called Socratic dialogue
which takes the place of the lectures that are commonplace in other parts
of the university. Perhaps more important, proponents of the case method
contend that it teaches students how to "think like lawyers." Specifically,
they argue that the case method helps students learn to analyze and mar-
shal facts, spot and distinguish issues, and learn and evaluate holdings of
law.
Both students and teachers have recently come to criticize the case
method, but for opposite reasons. Law teachers increasingly complain that
this pedagogical device does not give students the kind of over-arching
theoretical perspective that will be of use to students even after the cases
35. P. 748.
36. Id.
37. Margolick, supra note 6, at 21.
38. Bok, supra note 6, at 45 (new forms of teaching in law schools will address students' com-
plaints about legal education and provide opportunity to confront defects of legal system).
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in the book have been overruled, distinguished away, or reduced to stat-
ute. Although the case method retains ardent supporters in legal educa-
tion, virtually no one would suggest that the device should be the exclusive
medium of the law school curriculum. Law students, in contrast, are un-
happy with the case method "not because it neglects to raise the larger
questions but because it fails to answer the smaller ones." To the students,
the greatest shortcoming of the case method is that "it is irrelevant and
insufficiently concrete."39 Their complaints about the case method per-
haps cannot be addressed through new written materials, but only
through the clinical programs that have become an increasingly important
aspect of the law school curriculum in recent years.40
Surprisingly, the pedagogical concerns of law teachers have produced
few alternatives to the casebook. These concerns, I suggest, evince a strong
demand for a teaching device that can overcome the inadequacies of the
traditional case method. Securities Regulation is the most promising so
far.
The book has plenty of cases-forty-six-but has far fewer than the
traditional law school text. Over seventy-five percent of the book "comes
from [Professor Loss'] own pen."14 ' The rest of the book is divided among
cases, S.E.C. releases, and miscellaneous periodical literature.
As such, this book constitutes an important tool for securities law
professors who want to move away from the limits of the case method. If
it is successful it may provide an example for authors in other fields.
Securities regulation, like tax, bankruptcy, and corporate finance, is tra-
ditionally taught to second- and third-year law students. These students
find such courses difficult, not simply because of the intrinsic complexity
of the subject matter, but because they are generally unfamiliar with the
underlying business transactions that give rise to the legal problems. Sig-
nificantly, corporate clients believe that (besides basic professional compe-
tence) an understanding of the underlying business transactions is the
most important attribute of an effective corporate counsel.42
Cases are often unwieldy in courses dealing with the legal aspects of
business transactions because, while they may teach students the current
state of the law (and perhaps a bit of legal reasoning), they often convey
too little about the nature of the underlying transactions. Moreover, law
39. Margolick, supra note 6, at 25.
40. Some law schools, notably Antioch and Northeastern, have traditionally placed clinical train-
ing at the center of their programs of instruction. Other schools, such as Yale and N.Y.U., have
established clinical programs more recently.
41. P. xix.
42. Donnell, Reflertions of Corporate Counsel in a Two Way Mirror, 22 Bus. LAW. 991, 993
(Table I) (1967).
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teachers themselves are frequently ill-equipped to handle this aspect of the
course.
Perhaps most important, one's inability to understand the mechanics of
a business transaction such as a tax swap, an oil and gas financing, or a
corporate merger impedes any kind of subtle analysis. The most enduring
legal principles reflect the underlying economic realities of the businesses
whose conduct they regulate. An understanding of the economic principles
that underlie the legal rules applicable to business transactions is at least
as important as the legal reasoning involved.
If the complexity of modern social, business, and economic relations
shapes the legal topography beyond the ability of the traditional case
method to adjust, law books should provide an alternative. Securities Reg-
ulation is one that works extremely well, especially when viewed as the
first of a kind.
A good example of Loss' novel treatment of the development of one
aspect of securities regulation is the difficult subject of defining exactly
what constitutes a "security.14 3 The issue is of no small moment. As Pro-
fessor Loss points out, the question has been before the Supreme Court
eight times, and each time the Court has reversed the decision below."'
Yet the two most widely read casebooks in the field give this subject rela-
tively cursory treatment. One covers the subject in forty-six pages,4 5 and
the other, remarkably, in twenty-four. 46 Professor Loss devotes almost one
hundred pages to this eclectic area. 7
Professor Loss has done a superlative job of organizing and presenting
this material. He opens the discussion with SEC v. Diversified Indus-
tries.48 While Diversified is no jurisprudential landmark, it does an excel-
lent job of marshalling the myriad views embraced by the circuit courts.
As the case points out, the Third,49 Fifth,5" Seventh, 51 and Tenth52 Cir-
cuits apply an "investment/commercial dichotomy test" to determine
whether an investment vehicle is a security. The Ninth Circuit 3 follows a
43. P. 213.
44. P. 167.
45. R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 3, at 185-231.
46. D. RATNER, SECURITIES REGULATION: MATERIALS FOR A BASic COURSE 223-47 (2d ed.
1980).
47. Pp. 167-261.
48. 465 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 1979).
49. Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973).
50. Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank, 495 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1974).
51. C.N.S. Enter. v. G. & G. Enter., 508 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825
(1975).
52. McGovern Plaza Joint Venture v. First of Denver Mortgage Investors, 562 F.2d 645 (10th
Cir. 1977).
53. Amfac Mortage Corp. v. Arizona Mall, 583 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1978).
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"risk capital" test, and Judge Friendly, speaking for the Second Circuit,54
uses a "literal approach."
Professor Loss also provides an important historical perspective. 55
Before the inflationary era that began in the 1950's, the distinction be-
tween an insurance policy and a security was relatively clear. People sell-
ing securities had to register them under the provisions of the Securities
Act of 1933, and people selling insurance policies did not. In the mid-
1950's, however, insurance companies became justifiably concerned about
losing business to mutual funds because inflation was rendering tradi-
tional fixed rate term insurance an unattractive investment.
Insurance companies invented the variable annuity in response to this
problem. A variable annuity does not offer a fixed amount of money at the
maturity date as does a traditional annuity. Instead, a variable annuity
pays the holder the market value of his share of a portfolio of securities.
The value of the holder's share fluctuates monthly as the market value of
the underlying portfolio changes. Those who believe interest rates will rise
will prefer variable annuities because the monthly return will rise along
with the market. Needless to say, this invention shares many features with
a security, such as a mutual fund share, and only a few with an insurance
policy.
Without background information regarding the context of legal defini-
tions of "insurance" and "security," it would be impossible fully to under-
stand and evaluate seminal cases such as SEC v. Variable Annuity Life
Ins. Co. of America 51 (VALIC). In VALIC, the Supreme Court, by a vote
of 5-4, held that a Washington, D.C. life insurance company which sold
nothing but variable annuities must register them as securities under the
'33 and '34 Acts. Securities Regulation provides a unique approach to
variable annuities. The book does not print the VALIC case, but summa-
rizes the lower court's opinions as well as that of the Supreme Court, in
less than one page.57 The most important material, the background infor-
mation, is conveyed in purely expository form.
But Professor Loss does not stop with this concise exposition of the
background and disposition of the VALIC case. Rather, he challenges the
reader to imagine the full implications of the Court's decision, because
"the VALIC case inevitably left a number of both conceptual and practical
problems in its wake."58 From here he guides the now seasoned reader
through a number of even more esoteric hybrids, including flexible fund
54. Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976).
55. Pp. 214-17
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annuities, group annuity contracts (popularly known as Keogh plans), va-
riable life insurance policies, and tax deferred annuity contracts, among
others.
Today, insurance hybrids are being invented faster than the regulators
can evaluate them, and far faster than the traditional casebook can incor-
porate them with adequate analysis of their social and economic implica-
tions. The approach that Securities Regulation takes to this problem-just
one example of many in the book-triumphs over the traditional case
method. Professor Loss leaves the student with a map of the intellectual
possiblities of structuring future payments for present investments:
[In the last analysis, there is no escaping the fact that there is a
continuous spectrum from a one-year term life insurance policy,
which is pure insurance, through the various forms of straight life
and endowment policies, to annuities and life insurance, both fixed
and (in varying degrees) variable, to mutual fund shares and ulti-
mately common stock, which represent pure investment.59
Within this framework the student can evaluate the developing new
forms of insurance, and the legal problems they create. In addition, Pro-
fessor Loss exposes the student to far more information about the underly-
ing business realities that produce legal problems than does the traditional
case method.
Securities Regulation provides a glimpse of what may become the stan-
dard law school textbook style of the future. The appellate decision will
not disappear-it will continue to play an important role, particularly in
the first-year curriculum where the emphasis is on the structure of the
common law and on development of basic analytical skills.
Later in law school, as attention shifts from the common law to the
analysis of statutes, new problems of pedagogy arise. Law schools may
continue to categorize these problems into discrete subjects such as securi-
ties regulation, corporations, and taxation, but students, if they are to be-
come competent practitioners, must recognize and develop an understand-
ing for the business environment in which all these subjects arise and
operate. The same holds true for practitioners moving into a new area of
practice. Securities Regulation is a superb tool for accomplishing both
goals.
One other, perhaps more important goal for a book of this sort is a bit
more elusive. It is difficult to describe and difficult to achieve. That goal is
to provide students with the theoretical and analytical skills necessary to
59. P. 224.
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adapt to a rapidly changing legal and regulatory environment. In another
day this was described as "teaching students to think like lawyers."
The challenge faced by legal educators is remarkably similar to that
faced by the cadre of philosophers and computer scientists currently ex-
ploring the frontiers of artificial intelligence. Their goal is not merely to
program the computer to act pursuant to a large set of pre-programmed
instructions. Rather, it is to develop a program that creates new instruc-
tions in response to new situations; that can, in other words, "form its own
rules."6 The program can then function on its own in reaction to new
stimuli without further input from the programmer. The machine is thus
liberated from its teacher-the programmer. The goals of legal education
are essentially the same. What is a first-rate education, other than a two-
step process of data assimilation and then liberation from the shackles that
the data has imposed? The successful student is the one who reacts quick-
ly to new rules and new problems and is comfortable in a world of con-
stant change. This student, in the words of Justice Traynor
comes to realize how essential it is, . . . that he be intellectually
interested in a rational outcome. He cannot remain distorted forever,
his mind suspended between alternative passable solutions. Rather
than to take the easy way out . . . he can strive to deepen his in-
quiry and his reflection enough to arrive at last at a value judgment
as to what the law ought to be and to spell out why."'
Securities Regulation offers precious little guidance for developing the
kinds of value judgments that Justice Traynor described as "essential" for
the successful student. The reader of this book will come away with a
clear view of what the law is, but without the skills to evaluate what the
law should be or what it is likely to become.
CONCLUSION
It is no surprise that Securities Regulation demonstrates a consummate
mastery of the field. The book provides a valuable service to students and
practitioners, as well as a welcome change of pace to teachers whose peda-
gogical burden will be greatly eased by the book's engaging prose and
careful exposition. For this alone, Professor Loss deserves "the rush that
60. Gleick, Exploring the Labyrinth of the Mind, N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1983, §6 (Magazine), at
23, 26 (quoting L. Shank, head of artificial intelligence laboratory, Yale University) (emphasis in
original).
61. "The Mind Counts," address by The Honorable Roger J. Traynor, 47th Annual Meeting of
the American Law Institute (May 22, 1970) (on file with the Yale Law Journal).
1184
Vol. 93: 1173, 1984
Securities Regulation
occasionally comes from doing something very well which is very hard to
do at all." '62
In addition, the book should be of interest to legal scholars, as it is the
most important alternative to the casebook yet to appear on the market for
classroom use. Its success, one hopes, will encourage even bolder forays
into the domain of the casebook. Particularly promising is the prospect of
a book that will help to provide students with a basis for independent
thought, a theoretical structure for determining what the law should be.
62. Leff, Afterword, 90 YALE L.J. 1296, 1296 (1981).
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